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NoTES AND Conmnmrs

ALTERNATIVE PLEADING IN KENTUCKY
Pleading in the alternative occurs in two ways, either as to the
subject matter of the cause or defense, or as to the parties.1 At common law, pleading in the alternative was not permissible. For example
an allegation that the defendant wrote and published, or caused to be
written and published, a certain libel, was bad for uncertainty
However, alternative pleading is desirable because often the
pleader cannot know nor reasonably be expected to know, which of
two or more alternatives is the correct one. Especially is tbis true
as to the details of an injury or breach, which often are known only
to the defendant m advance of trial. Thus, it is unfair to enforce
strictly the common law rule prohibiting pleading in the alternative
unless the common law rule permitting inconsistency in pleading is
also adopted.: Therefore the rule pernitting allegations in the alternative is very desirable in any jurisdiction which, as does Kentucky,
considers inconsistency a vice. 3 Alternative pleading is permitted
under the Federal Rules 4 and in at least ten jurisdictions in the United
States, including Kentucky - In several states it is permitted by judicial decision.0
Kentucky however, has placed a limitation on alternative pleading,
that of allowing pleading in the alternative as to facts or subject-matter
but not as to parties. Thus, the pleader cannot allege in the alternative
that one or the other of two defendants is liable.

'CLANK, CODE PLEADLNG, 254

(2d ed. 1947).

At common law pleading in the alternative was considered a defect in form,
objectionable on special demurrer. However, if a party had a cause of action,
but was not certain as to the most expedient way of stating it, the common law
permitted a single cause of action to be differently stated in separate counts, in
the same declaration. However, under the Codes the use of inconsistent counts
is either not pernissible, as in Kentucky (Post, note 3) or is not desirable because
such a practice is confusing and cumbersome.

Ky.

CODE CiV.

PRAc. ANN., sec. 118 (Carroll's 1948).

'Fed. R. Civ. P 8 (e) (2) (1948), as follows:
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.
When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if
made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by
the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also
state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both."
Aniz. CODE ANN., see. 21-408 (2) (19.39); COLO. STAT. ANN., Rule 8 (e)

(2) (Michle 1935); CONN. PRAc.

BK., P

30, sec. 88 (1934); ILL.

ANN. STAT.,

ch.

(Smith-Hurd); Ky. CODE CIv. PRAC. ANN., sec. 118 (Carroll's
1948); MASS. GEN. LAN,:, c. 231, see. 37 (1932); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., sec.
847.42; N.J. Sup CT. Rule 53, Rule 37, Pr. Act 1912 (1938); N.M. STAT. ANN.,
see. 19-101 (822) (1941); TFx. RULES CIV. PROC., Rule 48 (Vernon 1942).
Supra, note 1, at 2,56, footnote 142.
110, see. 167 (2)
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In Powell v Manufacturers Coal and Coke Company,7 is was
stated that:
"The appellant filed is motion in the Pike Circuit Court
against the appellee and Lafe Stansbury and George Childers. The
substance of his allegations was that the defendants, the one or the
other of them, but he did not know which, had taken from him cer-

tain property exempt to him as a housekeeper of the aggregate value
of $324, and that he had demanded a return of the property, but
they had refused to retun it. A demurrer was interposed to the
petition and sustained by the court. The demurrer was properly
sustained, as the petition does not allege who took the property from
appellant. The provisions of the Civil Code, see. 113, allow alternative statements relating to the facts, but they do not allow alternative

statements relating to the parties. The appellant, therefore, may have
alleged that the defendants were jointly liable to him, or he may have
alleged that one or more of them was liable; but when he alleged
that one or the other of them was guilty of violating his property
rights he made his petition bad."' (Italics writers).

In Hartzell v Bank of Murray," it was alleged m a cross-petition
that the defendant had turned over notes to the plaintiff bank for
collection to cover the note upon which it was suing. The balance was
to be returned to the defendant. It was alleged that either the bank
or the cashiercollected the notes, but that the defendant had no means
of knowing which. This was held msufficient to sustain a judgment
against either the bank or the executors of the cashier, under the
rule that a cause of action against one party or another is not good
against either.
Having shown that pleading in the alternative in Kentucky is
permitted only as to facts or subject-matter but not as to parties, we
will focus our attention on the limited practice of alternative pleading
as it exists in this state.
The pleader is not limited to the pleading of only two alternative
facts, two or more being allowable. In Lowsville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v Wyatt's Admr.,10 the first error complained of by the appellant was that the court failed to sustain its motion to compel the
appellee to elect which of the several grounds of recovery set up in
her petition and amended petition she would rely upon, and that the
other grounds be stricken from the pleading. The court, after citing
subsection 4 of section 113 of the Code, stated:
"The appellant contends that the Code does not provide or
allow the statement in a pleading of more than two inconsistent acts,
and as appellee stated more than two, therefore the court should

230 Ky. 784, 20 S.X 2d 991 (1929).
*Id. at 785, S.W at 991.
* 211 Ky. 263, 277 S.W 270 (1925).
" 29 Ky. L.R. 437 (1906).
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have sustained its motion. We do not think this is a proper construetion of this provision of the Codes. If a party loses his life, and it
is alleged that his death was caused by one or more of three different
acts of negligence, but did not know which
in substance and
effect this would be proper pleading under the Code. There can be
no good reason shown why this provision should be limited to two
inconsistent facts, and in our opinion it was not intended to be so

limited.""

Another requirement of alternative pleading is that regardless
of the number of alternatives, each of them must state a good cause
of action. It will not suffice that one alternative states a good cause
of action even if the other does not. In Hoffman v City of Maysville12
the plaintiff was suing the City of Maysville because he was injured by falling through a sidewalk into a pool of hot water. The
original petition stated a good cause of action against the city because
it alleged that the drain was defective at a point under the sidewalk, and that the plaintiff broke through and fell into the pool
beneath while lawfully using the highway, and that the municipality
knew, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence could have known,
of the defective drain and the dangerous pool beneath the sidewalk.
In either case, if the municipality knew or could have known of the
defect, the plaintiff would have stated a good cause of action. However, the plaintiff alleged in an amendment to his original petition
that the pool of hot water had accumulated either under the sidewalk
or at a point within the private property of the company to whom
the City of Maysville had given permission to construct and maintain a wooden box sewer under the sidewalk. The plamtiff stated
tat one of these alternative allegations of fact was true, but he did
not know which. As stated by the court:
"The rule is, that where facts are stated in the alternative
wvith the allegation that one or the other istrue, but the pleader does
not know which istrue, both of the alternative statements must present a cause of action. If one, even if true, fails to present a cause of

action, the pleading is bad."
The court cited the section of the Code with which we are concerned, and held that the lower court correctly sustained the general
demurrer of the city to the amended petition. The alternative allegation stating that the pool of hot water had accumulated at a
point within the private property of the company failed to state a
cause of action, since in such event, the city would not be liable for
accumulation of water upon premises it was under no duty to inspect.
"

Id. at 440, 441.
12:3 Ky. 707, 97 S.W .360 (1906).
ld. at 710; S.W at 361.
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The entire cause of action failed because of the defective alternative
14
pleading.
Analagous to the requirement that each alternative compaint or
claim must state a good cause of action, is the requirement that
where there are alternative defenses each must make out a defense
or both are bad. In Rogers v McAlister'5 the defendant Frank Rogers
purchased property at a delinquent tax sale. The auditor of the
state executed and delivered to Rogers a deed for the property
Plamtiff, who claimed as a remamderman brought suit against Rogers
to cancel the deed executed to hmi by the auditor alleging that it was
void for a number of reasons. Rogers filed an answer and an
amended answer. The answer alleged that the tax delinquent held
the property either in her own right or as an agent for Joseph Price,
that he did not know which of these allegations was true. The court
stated that an allegation that the tax delinquent held the property
as an agent was a bad defense, for reasons not here pertinent. Thus,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer
to the entire defense.
"Where an answer contains alternative allegations each
alternative must present matter sufficient in law to constitute a
defense to the action. If either of them fails to state facts sufficient
to support the defense, the demurrer to it is properlv sustained."'

The Code s permission for a plea of facts in the alternative does
not extend to the pleader the license to plead causes of action m the
alternative by stating that he does not know which is true. In an old
Kentucky case,17 the plaintiff originally instituted an action on a
contract for logs. The plaintiff subsequently amended his petition
as one in tort as well as contract, alleging that defendant converted
the logs to his own use and further alleging that the statements as
to the contract or tort were true, but that he did not know which was
true. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated:
"A party must be presumed to know whether he is entitled
to recover on a contract or upon a tort, and be is required to set up

his cause of action in definite form, and can not be allowed to prosecute an action based upon a declaration showing the party either
indebted on contract or m tort, accompamed by the statement that
he does not know wbich.'~n
'4

In accord: Farmers Bank of West Lousville, Kentucky, and Holland Na-

tional Bank of Holland, Indiana v. American Surety Co., of N.Y., 205 Ky. 177,
265 S.W 505 (1924). Scobee v. Brent, Same v. Same, 185 Ky. 7.34, 216 S.W
76 (1919).
1-1151 Ky 488, 152 S.W 571 (1913).

Id. at 490, S.W at 572.

'7 Southern Lumber Co. v. Wireman, 19 Ky. L.R. 585 (1897).

Id. at 587,
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Alternative pleading under the Federal Rules is more liberal
than under the Kentucky Code in several respects. Under the Federal
Rules one may join parties in the alternative whether plaintiffs or
defendants.'" However, the Kentucky cases have held, as we have
seen, that parties may not be joined in the alternative. Also under
the Federal Rules when clains or defenses are pleaded in the alternative, the entire pleading will not fail just because one of the claims
does not present a good cause of action or one of the alternative
defenses a good defense.", On the other hand, in Kentucky all the
alternative statements of fact must be sufficient or all the defenses
sufficient, and if one or more are insufficient, the rest though good
shall fail.-"
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Kentucky Code should be
revised so as to allow alternative pleading as to parties as well as to
facts. About twelve states and the Federal Rules already permit
joinder of plaintiffs in the alternative, and several allow joinder of
defendants in the alternative. This sort of joinder is a highly desirable
reforn as it permits the settlement of an entire dispute in a single
action and avoids the difficulties and possible injustice resulting from
22
the necessity of bringing separate suits.
It is true that cases have made a distinction between pleading
in the alternative as to parties and pleading in the alternative as to
subject matter or facts, but it is difficult to see a difference in principle between these examples of alternative pleading, the difference
being entirely historical. Even in England today parties plaintiff may
23
be joined in the alternative.
It is necessary however, to point out a limitation upon alternative
pleading of parties for which the Federal Rules does not provide. This
limitation is that the pleader, after stating in the alternative that one
"FED. R. Civ. P., 20 (a), as follows:
"Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law.or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendents if there is asserted
aganst them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect
of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise
in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need rot be interested in obtaimng or defending against all the relief demanded. judgment may be given for one or more
of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or

more defendants according to their respective liabilities. (Italics writer s).
I'Supra, note 4.
"' Supra. note 3.
'CLARK, op. cit. supra note 1 at 393. Also see, supra note 19.
Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleading. 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL
,365, :370 (1923-4).
-
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or the other party is liable should add; "but (the pleader) does not
know which." At this point the Federal Rule is too lax and it would
be well to require the pleader to make a statement that his pleading
is not sham, but that he actually does not know which defendant is
liable. The Federal Rules should adopt this limitation also in
connection with alternative pleading of facts. Kentucky has such
a limitation.
Another suggested reform is that an entire cause of action or
defense alternatively pleaded should not be held bad merely because
one of the alternatives is insufficient m itself to state a cause of action
or defense. The suggested change, with the limitations stated, follows the practice under the Federal Rules,2' 4 and seems to be a good
one. If neither alternative states a cause of action, the entire pleading
will fall before a demurrer. If one of the alternatives is so deficient,
it may be eliminated by a motion to strike, thus still leaving a good
count on which issue may be joined.
Gregory Hankin very aptly stated in an article entitled Alternative
25
and Hypothetical Pleading:
"The relaxation of the rule against alternative pleadings
has in no way injured our legal system. On the contrary, it is benefitting our procedure in that it eliminates many useless battles which
consu;me the time of the courts delaying suits and heaping expenses on
litigants. The reform with reference to this problem is not vet complete, for if we once realize that a disjunction does not necessarily
imply uncertainty, then there is no reason for sustaining a greater
vanety of objections to alternative pleading than to any other pleadings

MYER S. TULKOFF

'

Supra, note 4.
Supra, note 23.
Id. at 376,

